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Frontal asymmetry measured at rest using EEG is considered a stable marker of
approach-avoidance behaviors and risk taking. We examined whether without salient
cues of attention in the form of losses, predictability is reduced. Fifty-seven participants
performed an experiential decision task in a gain-only, loss-only, and mixed (gains and
losses) condition. Increased risk taking on the part of individuals with relatively high left
frontal activation, as denoted by the Alpha band, was only observed in the task involving
both gains and losses. Event-related potential analysis sheds light on the processes
leading to this pattern. Left-frontal dominant individuals had increased fronto-central
P300 activation following risky compared to safe outcomes, while right-frontal dominant
individuals did not show a P300 difference following safe and risky outcomes. This
interaction also only emerged when losses were contrasted with gains. The findings
highlight the sensitivity of behavioral predictability to cues of valence.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent lines of research in predicting behav-
ior from “at rest” physiological measures is the study of frontal
EEG asymmetry. Davidson (1992, 1995) theorized that while both
the left and right frontal regions are involved in the processing of
emotions, left frontal regions are more active during approach-
related emotions, whereas right frontal regions are more active
during withdrawal related emotions. This hypothesis was con-
firmed by the finding that left frontal activity at rest is correlated
with increased motivation to approach potentially positive stim-
uli (e.g., Davidson, 1992, 1995, 2004; Harmon-Jones and Allen,
1997; Sutton and Davidson, 1997, 2000; Coan et al., 2001; Coan
and Allen, 2003, 2004)1 and increased risk taking (Knoch et al.,
2006; Gianotti et al., 2009; Studer et al., 2013). More recently it
was found that frontal EEG asymmetry is only modestly herita-
ble (Bismark et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2011) and that it is highly
sensitive to external stimuli such as music (Mikutta et al., 2012).
However, no previous study has examined boundary conditions
for the behaviors that could be predicted by frontal asymmetry.
We take the approach that a substantial part of the variance of
inter-individual differences in behavior is due to random influ-
ences, and examine whether salient cues of attention in the form
of losses can increase the predictability of behavior.
A classical experiment by Kahneman and Tversky (1974)
demonstrates the dependence of behavior on random cues.
Participants were asked to indicate the percent of United Nations
countries that were African national. Before they answered, they
observed a roulette that was rigged to stop on either 10 or 65.
1In some studies right frontal activity was also found to be correlated with
increasedmotivation to withdraw fromnegative stimuli (e.g., Davidson, 1998)
but this was not replicated in other studies (e.g., Harmon-Jones and Allen,
1997; Coan and Allen, 2004).
Participants who observed the number 10 reported 25% on aver-
age, while those who saw the number 65 reported 45%. Hence,
the cues in the environment which the subjects were randomly
allocated to, affected much of their behavioral response. In a
recent line of studies Ariely et al. (Ariely et al., 2003; Ariely
and Norton, 2008) examined whether such random influences
would affect real-world decisions, such as pricing of products.
They found that presenting the last two digits of participants’
social security number as an initial purchase offer had a huge
effect on their valuation of a product. Ariely et al. (2003) further
suggested that although much of our behavior is determined by
random influences, people seek to coherently apply it to different
conditions.
We examined whether the association between frontal EEG
asymmetry and risk taking behavior would be more prominent
with losses, a salient cue known to increase attention and decrease
random responding (Taylor, 1991; Satterthwaite et al., 2007;
Yechiam and Hochman, 2013). For example, previous studies
have found that across different sessions, participants exhibited
higher test-retest reliability in risk-taking tasks with losses than
in tasks involving gains (Vlaev et al., 2009; Weller et al., 2011;
Yechiam and Telpaz, 2013). Losses were also found to increase
the association between low tonic arousal, which is considered
a determinant of precarious behavior (Ellis, 1987; Zuckerman,
1994), and actual risk taking level (Yechiam and Telpaz, 2011).
Therefore, we expected that the relationship between frontal
asymmetry and risk taking would be stronger in tasks involving
losses.
Following previous studies, (e.g., Harmon-Jones and Allen,
1997; Matsuda et al., 2013), we used the alpha band (8–13Hz) to
examine asymmetries in the frontal electrodes F3 and F4. In stud-
ies measuring simultaneous EEG and fMRI, frontal alpha power
recorded during rest in these electrodes was found to be inversely
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related to the BOLD response of the corresponding region of the
frontal cortex (Goldman et al., 2000; Laufs et al., 2003; Ritter and
Villringer, 2006)2.
We further examined whether the presentation of losses
impacts not only the behavioral responses to risk but also the
cortical responses contingent upon being presented with risky
outcomes. As with the behavioral results, it was assumed that the
association between tonic arousal and acute cortical responses to
risk would increase in task conditions involving losses because
of the lower sensitivity to random noise in these conditions.
First, we focused on the association between frontal asymmetry
and the P300 event related potential (ERP). The P300 com-
ponent it commonly thought to reflect cognitive operations
related to attention and resource allocation (Donchin and Coles,
1988). Importantly, the P300 was found to be elevated fol-
lowing large compared to small outcomes (Yeung and Sanfey,
2004), possibly due to the increased significance of large out-
comes (Gray et al., 2004). Moreover, individual differences in
this tendency were found, with stronger P300 amplitudes for
individuals with risk taking tendencies (Jia et al., 2013). To
the extent that left frontal asymmetry is associated with risk
taking, it was expected that left-dominant individuals would
show larger P300 disparity between risky and safe outcomes,
due to their increased exhilaration following large compared
to small payoffs. Yet similarly to the relation between at-rest
frontal asymmetry and behavior, we expected that this differ-
ence would be more prominent in task conditions involving
losses.
Additionally, we also examined another ERP component
directly associated with negative outcomes, the feedback-based
Error Related negativity (fERN). This is a rapid fronto-central
deflection which appears approximately 250ms after experi-
encing losses, compared to equivalent gains (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002; Massar et al., 2012). Because approach moti-
vation is associated with lower sensitivity to losses (Nash et al.,
2012), we expected the fERN to be stronger for individuals with
greater right frontal activity at rest.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty seven undergraduate students (30 males and 27 females)
from the Technion, Israel institute of technology, participated in
the study. Their mean age was 23.4 (SD = 2.3), ranging from 19
to 27. All of them were right handed, healthy, and free of neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorders. Participants were given a fixed fee
of 90 New Israeli Shekel (NIS). In addition to their basic fee, they
were also compensated according to the amount earned in the
decision tasks. If a participant lost money, then the amount was
deducted from his/her basic fee. The behavioral data of a larger
subject population including the current subjects was reported in
Yechiam and Telpaz (2013).
2Although it is widely accepted in the literature on frontal asymmetry that
baseline alpha power is inversely related to frontal cortical activation, it
appears that alpha oscillations also play an active role in information process-
ing tasks requiring the suppression of attention (for a review see Klimesch,
2012).
BEHAVIORAL TESTING
We manipulated the valence of the outcomes by administering
three repeated binary choice tasks, with either gains, losses, or
mixed gains and losses. The All-Gains task was converted to an
All-Losses task simply by multiplying all payoffs by -1. Because
performing an All-Losses task may be discouraging (Yechiam and
Hochman, 2013), we also added a Mixed task where a constant
amount was reduced from each payoff of the All-Gains task,
making some of the payoffs negative.
The participants performed all three tasks, with 60 trials per
task. On every trial they had to select, using the mouse, one of
two virtual buttons representing a Safe (S) and Risky (R) alter-
natives. The payoff distributions for each alternative in the three
tasks were as follows:
1. Mixed Task
S −5, 0, or 5 with equal probability
R −25,−20,−15, 15, 20, or 25 with equal probability
2. All-Gains Task
S 25, 30, or 35 with equal probability
R 5, 10, 15, 45, 50, or 55 with equal probability
3. All-Losses Task
S −35,−30, or−25 with equal probability
R −55,−50,−45,−15,−10,−5 with equal probability
Alternatives S and R had equal expected values (in each task), but
the variance of the outcome distribution was larger for R. In the
Mixed task the outcomes involved both gains and losses. In the
All-Gains (All-Losses) task a constant of 30 was added to (sub-
tracted from) all payoffs so that the outcomes did not include
any losses (gains). In each trial the choice outcomes were ran-
domly sampled. The study used a within-subject design and the
participants performed all three tasks in random order.
Prior to the beginning of the task, participants were informed
that their assignment would be to repeatedly select between two
buttons, and that some of their choices might be followed by gains
and others by losses. They were also informed that they would
perform three tasks and that their final take home amount would
be determined by the accumulating score in one randomly deter-
mined task. However, they were not given any prior information
as to the possible outcomes of selecting each button. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, following button selection the obtained payoff
was presented on the selected button and on the obtained pay-
off counter. The button remained “selected” with the outcomes
presented for 2 s. After a 1 s interval the next trial began. The
right and left buttons were randomly assigned to the S and R
alternative for each participant, thus controlling for the effect
of position. This ordering was kept constant throughout the
task.
Upon the beginning of the second and third tasks a message
appeared with the information that the participant would now be
performing a different task. At the end of the third task, partic-
ipants were compensated according to the accumulated number
of points earned in one randomly selected task, with a conversion
rate of NIS 1 per 100 points earned. Themain dependent measure
was the proportion of risky selections across trials.
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FIGURE 1 | An illustration of stimulus events in a single trial. At the
beginning of each trial two buttons were presented on the screen
(Alternatives). The participants had to choose one of the buttons. Each
selection was followed by a presentation of the obtained payoff on the
selected alternative and the obtained-payoff counter for 2 s. After a 1 s
interval the next trial began. Following each choice response the total
payoff counter was updated. In this example the participant selected the
left button and gained 25 points.
Additionally, we studied the effect of losses on participants’
mean response time (RT). In decision tasks with no time require-
ments, response time is considered a resource (Bettman et al.,
1990) which serves as an indication of elaborate processing
(Horstmann et al., 2009; Hochman et al., 2010). We predicted
that, as in previous studies, losses would result in increased RT
(Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; Xue et al., 2009; Yechiam and Telpaz,
2011), thus potentially demarcating an increase in the attentional
resource pool (Yechiam and Hochman, 2013).
DATA ACQUISITION
Upon their arrival, participants were given a description of the
study procedure and signed a consent form. We next recorded
their EEG at rest. They were seated in a comfortable chair in a
dimly lit soundproof room, and the experimenter communicated
with them from an adjacent control room. During the recording
participants were asked to relax and to minimize head and body
movements. Two 2-min periods of resting EEG were recorded,
one with eyes closed and one with eyes open. There was an inter-
val of 30 s between recording periods. Five minutes after the end
of the resting EEG measurement, participants began performing
the decision tasks.
EEG was recorded using the ActiveTwo Biosemi system from
19 electrode sites on the scalp (Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, T3,
C3, Cz, C4, T4, T5, P3, Pz, P4, T6, O1, O2), mounted on an
elastic cap (BioSemi, Amsterdam, the Netherlands) and placed
according to the international 10–20 system. The system includes
two additional electrodes, a Common Mode Sense (CMS) active
electrode and a Driven Right Leg (DRL) passive electrode serv-
ing as ground. Active electrodes integrate the first amplification
stage directly with the Ag/AgCl sensor, significantly reducing
the effects of noise. The output impedance of the active sensor
is smaller than 1 . To monitor artifacts originating from eye
movements and blinks, four additional electrodes were used (two
placed at lateral canthi and two below the eyes). In addition, two
other electrodes, placed behind the ears, were used for offline
referencing. Continuous EEG was recorded from 0.5–80Hz
and digitized at 256Hz, using BioSemi ActiveView acquisition
software.
DATA ANALYSIS
To compute the asymmetry index for each participant, the con-
tinuous EEG was divided into 2 s epochs (overlapping by 1.5 s).
The data was visually inspected for artifacts, and epochs con-
taining greater activity than 50mV were rejected (on average 8%
of the epochs were rejected). To derive power spectrum values
the data was submitted to Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). Power
was extracted in 0.5Hz bins, which were combined into spectral
bands. As noted above, for consistency with previous research
(e.g., Lee et al., 2011; Matsuda et al., 2013), we focused on the
alpha band (8–13Hz) in the frontal electrodes F3 and F43.
Because the distribution of power values tends to be posi-
tively skewed, alpha power values were natural log transformed
(Ln) to normalize the data distribution. An index of hemispheric
asymmetry was obtained by subtracting LnF4 from LnF3 values
(LnF3–LnF4). As the within-subject correlation between the eyes
open and eye closed measurement was very high (r = 0.82), we
combined both measures into one frontal asymmetry index by
averaging them (see e.g., Tomarken et al., 1990; Harmon-Jones
and Allen, 1997). ERP analysis for the electrophysiological data
recorded during the decision tasks was performed with EEGLAB
10.2.2 (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). The EEG data was filtered
offline with a pass band from 0.5 to 40Hz. Epochs were extracted
for a time window of 800ms post-stimulus, relative to a 200ms
pre-stimulus baseline. Artifacts caused by eye movements and
muscular activity were removed using independent component
analysis (ICA). Due to a technical problem there was no ERP
data for one of the participants. We conducted a median split
for the remaining 56 participants according to their frontal asym-
metry score as measured prior to the decision tasks. Participants
with higher alpha power at electrode site F3 (the left frontal elec-
trode) were regarded as right frontal dominant while participants
with higher alpha activation at electrode site F4 (the right frontal
electrode) were considered as left frontal dominant. The median
was very close to zero (−0.004µV). Hence, one group involved
27 individuals with right frontal dominance and one individ-
ual with an asymmetry score practically at zero; and the other
involved 28 individuals with left frontal dominance. We refer to
the two groups as the right frontal dominant (RFD) group, and
the left frontal dominant (LFD) group. In addition, we exam-
ined the LnF3–LnF4 score as a continuous predictor of individual
differences.
To test for statistical differences in risk taking level between
the two groups, we originally aimed to conduct an ANOVA with
group (LFD vs. RFD) as a between-subjects factor and deci-
sion task as a within-subjects factor; yet due to differences in
between-subject variance (see below) each decision task was sepa-
rately analyzed. In addition, we examined the correlation between
frontal asymmetry and risk taking in each decision task.
Our main ERP analysis compared the response to outcomes
from the safe and risky alternatives as well as to relative gains and
3We measured absolute alpha power (i.e., we did not divide it by the power of
other frequency bands).
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losses, and the effect of frontal asymmetry on these responses.
In the first analysis, we focused on the time-window of 350–
400ms after the outcomes presentation. This time-window cen-
tered around the visually identified P300 component peak in the
grand average waveforms. For analyzing the component peak,
the maximum voltage within the corresponding time window
was computed for each participant, separately for outcomes from
the risky and safe options. To statistically test for differences in
the P300 component, we used a mixed Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA) with frontal asymmetry as a continuous between-
subject factor and decision task and choice type (Safe vs. Risky)
as within subject factors.
Additionally, for each of the three tasks we also examined
the fERN component, centered around the visually identified
peak 250–300ms post stimulus, by comparing the ERP responses
following relative losses (outcomes below the average of all out-
comes) and relative gains (outcomes above the average of all
outcomes). In this analysis as well the minimum voltage within
the relevant time window was computed for each participant. A
mixed ANCOVA was conducted as for the P300 analysis, with
outcome valence replacing choice type as a within subject manip-
ulation. In both ERP analyses we focused on the activity at the
frontal electrode site Fz.
To estimate the neural generators of the brain activity asso-
ciated with the difference between risky and safe choices, we
used the standardized low-resolution electromagnetic tomogra-
phy (sLORETA). This is a linear source localizationmethod which
computes the standardized current density with close to zero
localization error (see Pascual-Marqui, 2002 for technical details).
The analysis was based on the difference between amplitudes for
relevant stimuli (e.g., risky minus safe outcomes for P300) at the
19 electrodes used in the study during the relevant time windows
following outcome presentation.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
The average proportion of risky choices across all trials was 0.46
(SD = 0.16) in the Mixed task, 0.49 (SD = 0.22) in the All-
Gains task, and 0.44 (SD = 0.16) in the All-Losses task. There
was no significant difference between task conditions [F(1, 56) =
1.02, p = 0.32]. The finding of no difference in risk taking level
between task conditions implies that, on average, losses did not
affect the behavioral decision to take or avoid risk in this binary
decision task. Thus, the participants did not show loss aversion, as
recorded previously in repeated decision tasks with feedback (see
review in Yechiam and Hochman, 2013).
Interestingly, the between-subject variances of the groups were
somewhat different, with greater variance in the All-Gains task
compared to the Mixed task [Levene F(1, 112) = 4.15, p = 0.04]
and All-Losses task [Levene F(1, 112) = 6.73, p = 0.01]. No such
differences were found between frontal asymmetry groups. Thus,
the difference between tasks did not conform to the homoscedas-
ticity assumption of the ANOVA, and in subsequent analyses
involving different tasks we analyzed each task separately (by
using t-tests).
An examination of response times (RT) showed that the aver-
age RT was 0.70 s (SD = 0.29) in the Mixed task, 0.61 s (SD =
0.17) in All-Gains task, and 0.65 s (SD = 0.21) in the All-Losses
task. The difference in RT between the three tasks was significant
[F(2, 54) = 3.83, p = 0.03]. Furthermore, paired-sample t-tests
showed that RT in the Mixed task was significantly longer than in
the All-Gains task [t(55) = 2.02, p = 0.048], but not significantly
longer than in the All-Losses task [t(55) = −0.93, p = 0.35]. The
difference between the All-Losses and All-Gains tasks was not
significant [t(55) = 1.70, p = 0.1].
FRONTAL ASYMMETRY AND RISK TAKING
A comparison of the average proportion of trials in which partic-
ipants in the LFD and RFD groups chose the risky option in each
task condition appears in Figure 2. In the Mixed task the average
rate of risky selections in the LFD group was 0.50 (SD = 0.17)
while in the RFD group it was 0.41 (SD = 0.13). The difference
between groups in this task was significant [t(54) = 2.19, p =
0.03]. In the All-Gains task, risk taking levels were similar in the
two groups (LFD: P(R) = 0.48, SD = 0.21; RFD: P(R) = 0.47,
SD = 0.21), and the difference between groups was not signifi-
cant [t(54) = 0.17, p = 0.86]. In the All-Losses task, as well, there
were no significant differences between groups [LFD: P(R) =
0.43, SD = 0.14; RFD: P(R) = 0.44, SD = 0.18; t(54) = −0.11,
p = 0.90].
Additionally, we conducted correlational analyses that take
into consideration individual variance within each group. The
Pearson correlation between the pre-task frontal asymmetry and
the rate of risky selections in the Mixed task was significant and
negative (r = −0.30, p = 0.02), implying that participants with
higher activation in the RFD tended to avoid risk. In the All-Gains
task the correlation was weak and not significant (r = −0.11,
p = 0.42), and in the All-Losses task the correlation was also not
significant (r = −0.19, p = 0.16). These results were replicated
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Mixed All-Gains All-Losses
Task
P(
Ri
sk
y)
LFD
RFD
FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion of selections from the risky option across
trials for the left frontal dominant (LFD) and right frontal dominant
(RFD) groups in each of the three decision tasks. The error bars
represent the standard error of the mean.
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using Spearman rank correlations; and also when controlling for
the order of the respective task using partial correlations (Mixed:
r = 0.30, p = 0.03; All-Gains: r = −0.10, p = 0.46; All losses:
r = −0.18, p = 0.19).
FRONTAL ASYMMETRY AND EVENT RELATED POTENTIALS
Figure 3 illustrates the waveforms following risky and safe out-
comes in the LFD and RFD groups. In order to examine differ-
ences in peak P300 responses we conducted a mixed ANCOVA
with decision task and choice type (Safe vs. Risky) as within-
subject factors and frontal asymmetry as a continuous between-
subject factor. This analysis yielded a significant decision task by
choice type by frontal asymmetry interaction [F(2, 108) = 5.44,
p = 0.006]. This result was replicated when controlling for task
order by including the position of the Mixed and Loss tasks as
additional covariates [F(2, 108) = 5.84, p = 0.004]. We proceeded
by separately analyzing each of the decision tasks.
For the Mixed task there was no main effect of frontal
asymmetry [F(1, 54) = 0.03, p = 0.88] and a marginally signifi-
cant effect of choice type [F(1, 54) = 3.50, p = 0.067]. However,
the interaction between frontal asymmetry and choice type
FIGURE 3 | Grand-average ERP waveforms recorded at electrode site
Fz during the Mixed, All-Gains, and All-Losses tasks for the RFD (right
column) and LFD groups. The red line shows the average ERP response
following outcomes from risky choices and the green dashed line indicates
the response following outcomes from safe choices. A stronger P300
response following risky compared to safe outcomes emerged for the LFD
group in the Mixed task.
was significant [F(1, 54) = 4.46, p = 0.04]. Post-hoc t-tests with
Bonferroni corrections for the median-split groups showed that
the P300 response was significantly stronger following risky
than following safe outcomes in the LFD group [t(27) = 2.80,
p < 0.01], but not in the RFD group [t(27) = −0.35, p = 0.73].
Thus, in the Mixed task, only the LFD group showed increased
P300 following outcomes from the risky alternative. None of the
remaining interactions was significant.
The ANCOVA for the All-Gains task indicated no main effect
of frontal asymmetry [F(1, 54) = 0.92, p = 0.34] or choice type
[F(1, 54) = 0.70, p = 0.41], and no interaction between these two
factors [F(1, 54) = 2.62, p = 0.11]. In the All-Losses task there
was also no main effect of frontal asymmetry [F(1, 54) = 0.92,
p = 0.34] or choice type [F(1, 54) = 0.70, p = 0.41], and no inter-
action [F(1, 54) = 2.61, p = 0.11]. Hence, the relation between
frontal asymmetry predisposition and the P300 response only
emerged in the mixed gain-loss setting.
We next examined the frontocentral responses to relative gains
and relative losses (see Figure 4). A mixed ANCOVA for the fERN
time window yielded no significant decision task by outcome
valence by frontal asymmetry interaction [F(2, 53) = 1.46, p =
0.24]. Moreover, a separate analyses of the Mixed tasks showed
that the interaction of decision task by outcome valence was
only marginally significant [F(1, 54) = 3.00, p = 0.09]. This result
was replicated when controlling for the order of the mixed task
[F(1, 53) = 2.90, p = 0.09]. We thus did not proceed further in
conducting post-hoc tests for the different frontal asymmetry
groups. For control purposes, we also analyzed the P300 results
by outcome valence (following relative gains vs. losses) and the
fERN results by choice type (following safe or risky outcomes).
Both analyses showed no significant results.
Source localization analysis for the P300 (using sLORETA)
focused on the LFD group’s performance in theMixed task, where
a significant difference was observed following safe and risky out-
comes. As shown in Figure 5, the estimated maximal activity of
for the time window of the P300 response (350–400ms) in the
LFD group was located at Brodmann area 10 of the middle frontal
gyrus (x = −20, y = 60, z = 25). A paired t-test revealed that
for LFD individuals, at this location the difference between the
brain response following safe and risky choices was significant
[t(27) = 2.76, p = 0.01]4.
DISCUSSION
Over the last 15 years it has become clear that there is a link
between frontal asymmetry and choice behavior. The pioneer-
ing studies in this area have shown that greater right frontal
EEG activity at rest characterizes individuals with low behav-
ioral activation (Davidson, 1992, 1995; Harmon-Jones and Allen,
1997; Sutton and Davidson, 1997; Coan and Allen, 2003), and,
in some studies, also higher behavioral inhibition (e.g., Sutton
and Davidson, 1997). This led to the discovery of a link between
frontal asymmetry and risk taking (Knoch et al., 2006; Gianotti
et al., 2009; Studer et al., 2013). Risky situations, which are
4This statistical test should be qualified, however, for the fact that the
sLORETA tests for differences in a solution space that containsmore than 6000
voxels.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 149 | 5
Telpaz and Yechiam Predictability of behavior by frontal asymmetry
indistinct in terms of their overall value but have higher variance
and greater polarity of outcomes, seem to provide a behav-
ioral testing ground for approach and avoidance tendencies
(Goudriaan et al., 2006; Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007; Demaree et al.,
FIGURE 4 | Grand-average ERP waveforms recorded at electrode site
Fz during the Mixed, All-Gains and All-Losses tasks for the RFD (right
column) and LFD groups. The red line shows the average ERP response
in trials with relative losses and the green dashed line denotes trials with
relative gains. The fERN effect, marking increased activation to losses
compared to gains, was most distinct for the RFD group in the Mixed task.
2008). Still, the boundaries of the relation between frontal hemi-
spheric asymmetry and risk taking have hardly been examined. In
the current paper, we suggested that the predictive value of frontal
asymmetry is reduced in risk taking tasks without salient cues of
attention, in the form of losses.
Our results showed that the predicted relation between frontal
asymmetry and risk taking was only significant in a risk taking
task involving both gains and losses. This relation did not emerge
in a task involving only gains. In previous studies (e.g., Gianotti
et al., 2009; Studer et al., 2013) frontal asymmetry predicted risk
taking in a gain-domain task. However, in both of these studies
the task also included the consequence of zero (losing all gains),
which may lead to an orienting effect similar to that of losses.
Interestingly, the association between frontal asymmetry and
risk taking was also considerably lower (and not significant)
in the condition where all outcomes were losses. This finding
may be explained by the suggestion that a loss is more salient
when introduced against a reference point of a gain (Loomes
and Sugden, 1982; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). For instance,
under regret theory such a presentation facilitates the regret asso-
ciated with the loss (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), which may in
turn increase its salience and its effects on behavioral predictabil-
ity. Alternatively, the null finding in the all-loss condition can be
explained by the suggestion that a choice environment involv-
ing all losses may result in learned helplessness (Yechiam and
Hochman, 2013), thereby having negative effects on the invest-
ment of attention toward the task (Alloy and Abramson, 1979).
Under both accounts gains and not only losses increase the rela-
tion between physiological predispositions, such as frontal EEG
asymmetry, and overt behavioral responses.
An analysis of event related potentials provided further
support for the moderating role of losses. Greater left frontal
activation level at rest was associated with increased fronto-
central activation following outcomes from the risky alternative
(compared to the safe alternative) within the P300 component;
FIGURE 5 | sLORETA-based maps illustrating the density differences
between the two frontal asymmetry groups at the P300 peak amplitudes.
The Talairach slices illustrate the estimated source of localized maximal activity
of the P300Risky−Safe effect in the Mixed task for the LFD group. sLORETA
localized the source of activity in BA 10 of themiddle frontal gyrus.Warm colors
indicate higher current density (A/m2.10−2) following risky than safe outcomes.
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but this relation was only observed in the Mixed task with gains
and losses. sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) located the source
of this effect at the middle frontal gyrus (MFG), which is part of
BA 10, an area in which activation patterns were previously found
to be related to risk sensitivity (Rogers et al., 1999; Schonberg
et al., 2012). In other studies Brodmann area 10 has been linked to
processes related to exploratory behavior (Boorman et al., 2009;
Badre et al., 2012), which shares some of the features of risk task
behavior (e.g., the need to balance potential benefits and adverse
consequences). Related research has suggested that the BA 10 has
an important role in the integration of cues with opposing out-
comes (see Burgess et al., 2007; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007). Our
results add to this by demonstrating that the activation pattern
in this area is influenced by individual differences, with stronger
P300 responses for individuals with left frontal dominance at
rest. However, these individual differences are only triggered with
losses. It should be noted, though, that our source localization
analyses used only 19 electrodes, which might have contributed
to a limited spatial resolution of the source estimations.
By contrast, right frontal asymmetry was not associated with
greater fronto-central activation following negative outcomes at
the fERN component. This is inconsistent with previous find-
ings suggesting that the fERN amplitude is a marker for processes
mediating the association between resting EEG activity and risk
taking behavior (Massar et al., 2012). However, our findings did
show marginally significant results in the direction of greater
fERN effect for the right frontal dominance group. Thus, the
differences might be due to the smaller number of trials in the
present investigation.
To summarize, our results showed that a significant relation
between a neural predisposition to take risk and actual risk taking
only emerged in the condition involving both gains and losses,
a condition in which participants also invested the most time in
the task. Additionally, the ERP results suggest that left dominant
individuals showed more exhilaration following risky outcomes,
but only in the task involving both gains and losses. These find-
ings are consistent with our main argument that losses increase
the reliability of the link between frontal asymmetry and risk tak-
ing behavior. Yet they also suggest that a payoff regime including
only losses may lead to a breakup in these relations.
The results seem to be captured by Davidson’s (1998) model
in which the medial prefrontal cortex plays an important role
in maintaining representations of behavioral-reinforcement con-
tingencies in working memory. The embedded asymmetries in
approach and avoidance are maintained as long as there is a steady
attentional stream leading to the maintenance of task represen-
tations in working memory. In the absence of orienting stimuli
this stream is interrupted and correlations between the frontal
predisposition and actual behavior are attenuated. Nevertheless,
this limitation concerning the relation between frontal predis-
positions and behavioral expressions was not previously taken
notice of. We believe that only by taking such boundary condi-
tions into consideration can the research into tonic physiological
factors make claims that are of general predictive value.
The current findings are consistent with our previous results
showing that the link between tonic arousal and risk taking is
increased in tasks conditions with losses (Yechiam and Telpaz,
2011). Furthermore, they may serve to explain the increased rela-
tion between genetic predisposition and risk taking in tasks with
losses (e.g., Crisan et al., 2009; Zhong et al., 2009). For exam-
ple, Crisan et al. (2009) focused on one of the presumed genetic
markers of risk taking, the short version of the serotonin trans-
porter (5-HTTLPR) polymorphism. Their results showed that
carriers of the short allele (s-carriers) did not show a different risk
taking pattern when the task included only gains, but they exhib-
ited increased risk taking when one of the gains was framed as a
loss. Our theoretical model and findings suggest that this interac-
tion may be another case where individual differences are highly
affected by random processes, but becomemore predictable when
a task includes both gains and losses.
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